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War History 



RecoIIectibns of 

Hon. JOHN GOODE, Jr. 



1 



WAR HISTORY. 



Hon. JOHN OOODE. Jr. 



PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF PEACE CONFER- 
ENCE IN HAMPTON ROADS, AND LAST MEETING 
OF GENERAL R. E. LEE AND PRESIDENT JEFFER- 
SON DAVIS» ^^^^^^^^^.^^ 



Delivered Before 



R. E. Lee Camp, No. 1, C.V 



JANUARY JO, J902. 



RICHMOND, VA.: 
1902. 






U . CL . wl\JurAA^u-y^ob 



1 



crvu. 



Recollections. 



IN compliance with the request of the E. E. Lee Camp of 
Confederate Veterans, I give ray personal recollection as 
to two matters which have recently engaged, to some extent, 
the public attention. 

First. It has been asserted that General Lee, a short time 
before the collapse of the Confederacy, advised the Confed- 
erate authorities that further resistance was useless, and that 
he recommended a cessation of hostilities upon the best terms 
that could be obtained. I am satisfied, from my own personal 
knowledge, that this is a mistake. 

A few days before the final adjournment of the Confederate 
Congress, on the 18th of March, 1865, I received a message 
from President Davis through Colonel Lubbock, a member of 
his staff, that he desired to see me on important business at 
his ofiice. I responded at once, and upon ray arrival I found 
Mr. Davis and General Lee in consultation. After an ex- 
change of salutations, Mr. Davis said he had sent for rae to 
request ray opinion as to the willingness of the people of 
Virginia to submit to further demands upon them for supplies 
of food and clothing, which were absolutely necessary to 
maintain the army in the field. 

After some general conversation, in which General Lee 
said but little, I replied to the inquiry of the President by 
saying that, while I believed the people of Virginia were 
prepared to make still further sacrifices in support of the 
cause they held so dear, I preferred that the other Represen- 
tatives froni Virginia should be consulted, and suggested that 
they should be invited to the conference. This suggestion 
was adopted, and all the Virginia Representatives, fifteen in 
nuraber, by the invitation of the President, met him, his 
Cabinet and General Lee in the afternoon of the same day 



[ 4 ] 

at four o'clock. At this meetino; there was a fnll and free 
interchange of opinion, and all the Representatives concurred 
in saying that, in their opinion, the people of Virginia would 
be found ready and willing to meet any demand that might 
be made upon them, in the same spirit of loyalty and devo- 
tion that had characterized them since the commencement of 
the struggle. During the interview, General Lee explained 
the situation fully from a military standpoint. He referred 
to the length of the line he was obliged to defend, to the 
number of effective men, and the great scarcity of food for 
his soldiers and forage for his animals; but he did not say, 
nor did he intimate in any manner whatever, that in his 
opinion the cause was lost and that the time for surrender liad 
come. 

It will, be remembered that, two or tiiree weeks after the 
interview above referred to, he said in a note to General 
Grant that the time for the surrender of his army had not 
arrived. He was a soldier, and doubtless felt that it was not 
his province to volunteer advice to tlie political department 
of the Government, but to make the best fight he could with 
the means the Government was able to place at his disposal. 

Secondly. It has been charged by some that if the Confed- 
erate authorities had exhibited real statesmanship, an arrange- 
ment might have been made by which the slave owners would 
have been paid for their slave property, and that such an 
offer was actually made by the United States autiiorities in 
the famous Hampton Roads conference. This is also, in my 
opinion, a great mistake. 

As is well known. President Lincoln and Secretary Seward, 
on the morning of the 3d of February, 1865, met on board a 
steamer at Fortress Monroe Messrs. Alexander H. Stephens, 
R. M. T. Hunter, and John A. Campbell, who had been ap- 
pointed Commissioners by President Davis. The object of 
the conference was to ascertain upon what terms and in what 
way the war could be terminated. As is well known, the 
conference was a failure. L^pon the return of the Commis- 
sioners to Richmond, I heard two of them, Mr. Stephens and 
Mr. Hunter, discuss the incidents of the conference with 



fl|| 



[ 5 ] 

members of Congress at the Capitol, and they did not inti. 
mate that any proposition whatever had been made to pay 
the owners of slaves for their property. My recollection on 
this point is very clear, and it is supported by the official 
report signed by all three of the Commissioners, the message 
of President Davis, communicating that report to the Con- 
federate Senate and House of Representatives, the message 
of President Lincoln to the House of Representatives of the 
United States when he returned to Washington, and by a 
published statement, made within the last few years, by Hon. 
John H. Reagan, of Texas, who was a member of the Con- 
federate Cabinet. They all show conclusively, in my judg- 
ment, that the United States authorities refused to enter into 
negotiations with the Confederate States, or any of them 
separately, and that no truce or armistice would be granted 
without a satisfactory assurance in advance of the complete 
restoration of the authority of the United States. In other 
words, nothing would be accepted but an unconditional sur- 
render on the part of the Confederate authorities. It is true 
that, in the course of- the conference, the subject of slavery 
was discussed informally. Mr. Lincoln said that, as an indi- 
vidual, he would be in favor of paying a fair indemnity to 
the owners for the loss of their slaves, but on this subject he 
declared emphatically that he could give no assurance and 
enter into no stipulations. 

Perhaps it may be of interest to the CJamp to reproduce 
here the following article prepared by myself and published 
in the FoTura several years ago : 



[ 6 ] 



Hampton Roads Conference* 

One of the most interesting episodes of the war between 
the States was the informal conference that took place in 
Hampton Roads on the 3rd of February, 1865. The confer- 
ence was held on board of a steamer anchored near Fortress 
Monroe, and the participants were President Lincoln and 
William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, 
on the one hand, and Alexander H. Stephens, Robert M. T. 
Hnnter and John A. Campbell, Commissioners appointed by 
President Davis, on the other. There has long been consid- 
erable misapprehension in the public mind as to the origin, 
objects and results of that conference. As I was a member 
of the Confederate Congress at that time, and had, to some 
extent, an inside view of the situation, I propose to give my 
recollection of the incident referred to. 

In the beginning of the year 1865, the prospects of the 
Southern Confederacy were gloomy indeed. Grant with his 
hosts had swung around upon a new base, and was at City 
Point, on the James River, threatening Petersburg and 
Richmond, then defended by the Army of Northern Virginia 
under the incomparable Lee. That army during the preced- 
ing year had covered itself with imperishable glory in the 
Wilderness, at Spottsylvania Courthouse, and at Cold Harbor, 
Numbering less than sixty thousand men, it had inflicted a 
loss of more than fifty thousand upon the enemy in the 
campaign, resulting in Grant's change of base. But with 
inadequate supplies of food and clothing, it was then suffering 
all the discomforts and hardships of winter in the trenches 
around Petersburg and Richmond. Sheridan, in the Valley 
of Virginia, with a powerful and well-equipped army, had 
driven back Early with his little band of Confederates, and 
had completely devastated that beautiful and fertile region. 
Sherman, after destroying Atlanta and laying waste the sur- 



^! 



[ '? ] 

rounding country, was at Savannah with an army of sixty-five 
thousand men, prepared to inarch through the Carolinas and 
form a junction with Grant in Virginia. Such was the mili- 
tary situation when, in the early part of January, 1865, Mr. 
Francis P. Blair, Sr., a gentleman of great ability and 
acknowledged influence with the Administration at Washing- 
ton, made his appearance at Richmond. He brought with 
him no credentials, but exhibited to Mr. Davis the following 
card: 

"December 28, 1864. 
" Allow the bearer, F. P. Blair, Sr., to pass our lines, go South, and 
return. 

"(Signed) A. Lincoln." 

After a private interview with Mr. Davis, Mr. Blair re- 
turned to Washington, and in a few days came again to 
Richmond. Another consultation was held, in the course of 
which Mr. Blair suggested to Mr. Davis that a suspension of 
hostilities might be brought about by a secret military con- 
vention between the belligerents for the purpose of maintain- 
ing the Monroe Doctrine on this continent, and thereby 
preventing the threatened establishment of an empire by 
France in Mexico. He frankly declared that in his opinion 
the final result of the proposed military convention and the 
suspension of hostilities would be the restoration of the 
Union. On January 12th Mr. Davis handed to Mr. Blair 
the following letter : 

"Richmond, Va., January 12, 1865. 
" F. P Blair, Esq : 

"Sir, — I have deemed it proper and probably desirable to you to 
give j-^ou in this form the substance ol the remarks made by me to be re- 
peated b}- 3'ou to President Lincoln, &c. I have no disposition to find 
obstacles in forms, and am willing now, as heretofore, to enter into ne- 
gotiations for the restoration ot peace. I am ready to send a Com- 
mission whenever! have reason to suppose it will be received, or to 
receive a Commission, if the United States Government shall choose to 
send one. Notwithstanding the rejection of our former offers, I would, 
if you could promise that a Commission. Minister or other agent would 
be received, ap])oint one immediately and renew the effort to enter into 
a conference, with a view to secure peace to the two countries. 

"Yours, &c., 

"Jefferson Davis " 



[ 8 ] 

On January 18th Mr. Lincoln delivered to Mr. Blair the 
following communication, with the understanding that it 
should be shown to Mr. Davis : 

"Washington, January 18, 1865. 
"F. P. Blair, Esq.: 

" Sir, — You having shown me Mr. Davis' letter to you ot the 12th 
instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, and 
shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he or any other influen- 
tial person now resisting the national authority may informally send 
me, with a view of securing peace to the people of our common country. 

"Yours, &c., 

" A. Lincoln." 

After having seen the foregoing letter, and after consulta- 
tion with his Cabinet, Mr. Davis, on the 28th of January 
appointed Alexander H. Stephens, Hobert M. T. Hunter 
and John A. Campbell as Commissioners to proceed to Wash- 
ington and hold an informal conference with Mr. Lincoln 
upon the subject referred to in his letter of the 18th of Janu- 
ary, addressed to Mr. Blair. It was intended that the affair 
should be conducted with the utmost secrecy, but the absence 
of such prominent officials necessarily attracted attention, and 
the public soon ascertained that an important movement 
was on foot. Mr. Stephens at that time was Vice-President, 
Mr. Hunter was President ])ro tempore of the Senate, and 
Judge Campbell was Assistant Secretary of War. On Janu- 
ary 29th the Commissioners went from Richmond to Peters- 
burg, and on the following day addressed the following 
communication to General Grant: 

" Petersburg, Va., January 30, 1865. 
" Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, 

" Commanding Armies of the United States : 
" Sir, — We desire to pass your lines under saie conduct, and to pro- 
ceed to Washington to hold a conference with President Lincoln upon 
the subject of the existing war, and with a view of ascertaining upon 
what terms it may be terminated, in pursuance of the course indicated 
by him in his letter to Mr. Blair of January 18, 1865, of which we pre- 
sume you have a copy, and if not, we wish to see you in person, if con- 
venient, and to confer with you on the subject. 

" Very respectfully yours, 

"Alexander H. Stephens, 
"J. A. Campbell, 
"R. M. T. Hunter." 



[ 9 ] 

In reply, the following was received by the Commissioners 
at Petersburg, dated at Headquarters Army of the United 
States, January 31st, 1865, and signed by U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant-General : 

" Gentlemen, — Your communication of yesterday, requesting an in- 
terview with myself and a safe conduct to Washington and return, is 
received. I will instruct the commanding officers of the forces near 
Petersburg, notifying you at what part of the lines and the time when 
and where conveyances will be ready for you. Your letter to me has 
been telegraphed to Washington for instructions. I have no doubt that 
before you arrive at my headquarters an answer will be received direct- 
ing me to comply with your request. Should a different reply be re- 
ceived,! promise you a safe and immediate return within yourown lines. 
" Yours very respectfully, 

"U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General." 

In the afternoon of the same day, the Commissioners were 
met at a point previously designated on the Federal line by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Babcock, with an escort, and conducted 
to General Grant's headquarters at City Point. They were 
received by General Grant with marked civility and courtesy, 
and remained with him two days before they could arrive at 
an understanding with the authorities at Washington as to 
the conditions upon which they would be allowed to proceed. 
On Februarji 1st, Major Thomas T. Eckert, who had been 
sent with instructions from Mr, Lincoln as to the request of 
the Commissioners, addressed to them a letter, in which he 
informed them that if they passed through the United States 
military lines, it would be understood that they did so for the 
purpose of an informal conference on the basis of a paper 
prepared by Mr. Lincoln, a copy of which was placed in their 
hands. Without going into all the details of the correspond- 
ence between the Commissioners and Major Eckert, it is 
sufficient to state that, on February 1st, he telegraphed to 
Washington that the reply of the Commissioners was not 
satisfactory, and that he had notified them that they could 
not proceed further unless they complied with the conditions 
expressed in Mr. Lincoln's letter. On February 2d, the fol- 
lowing telegram was sent by General Grant to Mr. Stanton, 
Secretary of War : 



[10] 

"To Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War: 

" Now that the interview between Major Eckert, under his written 
instructions, and Mr. Stephens and party has ended, I will state confi" 
dentially, but not officially to become a matter of record, that I am 
convinced, upon conversation with Messrs. Stephens and Hunter, that 
their intentions are good and their desire sincere to restore peace and 
union. I have not felt myself at libert}' to express even views of my 
own or to account for my reticence. This has placed me in an awkward 
position, which I could have avoided by not seeing them in the first 
instance. I fear now their going back without any expression to any 
one in authority will have a bad influence. At the same time, I recog- 
nize the difficulties in the way of receiving these informal Commis- 
sioners at this time, and I do not know what to recommend. I am 
sorry, however, that Mr. Lincoln cannot have an interview with the 
two named in this dispatch, if not all three now within our lines. Their 
letter to me was all that the President's instructions contemplated — to 
secure their safe conduct — if they had used the same language to Cap- 
tain Eckert. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General." 

As soon as the foregoing telegram was shown to Mr. Lin- 
coln, he telegraphed to General Grant as follows: 

'' To Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Va. : 

" Say to the gentlemen that I will meet them personally at Fortress 
Monroe as soon as I can get there. A. Lincoln." 

At the same time he sent to Mr. Seward, who h d alread}^ 
gone to Fortress Monroe, the following telegram : 

" To Hon. WiLi.iAM H. Seward, Fortress Monroe, Va. : 

"Induced b3' a dispatch from General Grant, I join you at Fortress 
Monroe as soon as I can come. A. Lincoln." 

On the morning of February 3d, the Commissioners met 
President Lincoln and Secretary Seward on board of a steamer 
anchored in Hampton Koads, near Fortress Monroe. Mr. 
Stephens and Mr. Lincoln had been acquaintances and friends 
in former years. They had been in the House of Represen- 
tatives at the same time, had belonged to the same political 
party, and as members of the " Congressional Taylor Club," 
had co-operated in the nomination and election of Zachary 
Taylor to the Presidency in 1848. 



[11] 

At the beginning of the interview, Mr. Stephens, address- 
ing himself to Mr, Lincoln, made pleasant allusion to their 
former acquaintance and friendship, to which the latter cor- 
dially responded. After mutual inquiries as to former Con- 
gressional associates, Mr. Stephens introduced the business of 
the meeting by inquiring of Mr. Lincoln if there was no way 
of putting an end to the existing troubles and bringing about 
a restoration of good feeling and harmony between the dif- 
ferent sections of the country. At this point, Mr. Seward 
interposed and said it was understood that the conference 
would be informal, that there would be no clerk or secretary, 
and no record made of anything that was said. The Com- 
missioners having assented to this understanding, Mr. Stephens 
repeated his inquiry, and in reply Mr. Lincoln said that there 
was but one way that he knew of, and that was for those who 
were resisting the laws of the Union to cease that resistance. 
Mr. Stephens replied in substance that they had been induced 
to believe there might be some other question, some conti- 
nental question, that might divert the attention of both 
parties for a time from the questions involved in the existing 
strife until the passions on both sides might cool, when they 
would be in better temper to come to an amicable and proper 
adjustment, etc. Mr. Lincoln at once understood Mr. Stephens 
as referring to what Mr. Blair had suggested in his interviews 
with Mr. Davis. He said it was proper to state at the begin- 
ning that whatever Mr. Blair had said was of his own accord, 
and without the least authority from him ; that when Mr. 
Blair applied for a passport to go to Richmond and desired 
to present certain views, he had declined to hear them; tliat 
he had given the passport, but without any authority what- 
ever to speak for him; that when Mr. Blair returned from 
Richmond, bringing with him Mr. Davis' letter, he had given 
the one alluded to in the application of the Commissioners 
for permission to cross the lines; that he was always willing 
to hear propositions for peace on the conditions of that letter, 
and on no other; that the restoration of the Union was a 
sine qua non with him, and hence his instructions that no 
conference was to be held except upon that basis. After a 



[12] 

short pause in the conversation, Mr. Stephens continued to 
urge the adoption of the line of policy indicated by Mr. 
Blair, and claimed that it would most probably result in a 
restoration of the Union without further bloodshed. Among 
other things, he said that the principles of the Monroe Doc- 
trine were directly involved in the contest then going on in 
Mexico; that the Administration at Washington, according to 
all accounts, was decidedly opposed to the establishment of 
an empire in Mexico by France, and wished to maintain the 
right of self-government to all peoples on this continent 
against the dominion or control of any European power. Mr. 
Lincoln and Mr. Seward concurred in the statement that 
such was the feeling of a majority of the Northern people. 
"Then," said Mr. Stephens, "could not both parties in our 
contest come to an understanding and agreement to postpone 
their present strife by a suspension of hostilities between 
themselves until this principle is maintained in behalf of 
Mexico, and might it not, when successfully sustained there, 
naturally and would it not almost inevitably lead to a 
peaceful and harmonious solution of their own difficulties? 
Could any pledge now given make a permanent restoration 
or reorganization of the Union more probable, or even so 
probable, as such a result would ? " Mr. Lincoln replied with 
earnestness that he could entertain no proposition for ceasing 
active military operations which was not based upon a pledge 
first given for the ultimate restoration of the Union. He 
had considered the question of an armistice fully, and could 
not give his consent to any proposition of that sort on the 
basis suggested. The settlement of existing difficulties was 
a question of supreme importance, and the only basis on 
which he would entertain a proposition for a settlement was 
the recognition and re-establishment of the national autliority 
throughout the land. As the Commissioners had no authority 
to give any such pledge, the conference seemed to be at an 
end. 

According to an understanding between the Commissioners, 
before entering into the conference, that if they failed in se- 
curing an armistice, they would then endeavor to ascertain 



[13] 

upon what terms the Administration at Washington would 
be willing to end the war, Judge Campbell inquired in what 
way the settlement for the restoration of the Union was to be 
made. He wished to know something of the details. Mr. 
Seward then said he desired that any answer to Judge 
" Campbell's inquiry might be postponed until the general 
ideas advanced by Mr. Stephens might be more fully devel- 
oped. There was a general acquiescence in this suggestion, 
and Mr. Stephens proceeded to elaborate his views more fully. 
They were substantially as follows : 

That the Monroe Doctrine assumed the position that no 
European Power should impose governments upon any peo- 
ples on this continent against their will ; that the principle 
of the sovereign right of local self-goverument was peculiarly 
sacred to the people of the United States, as well as to the 
people of the Confederate States ; that the Emperor of France 
was at that time attempting to violate this great principle in 
Mexico ; that the suspension of hostilities and allowance of 
time for the blood of our people on both sides to cool towards 
each other, would probably lead the public mind to a clearer 
understanding of those principles which ought to constitute 
the basis of the settlement of existing difficulties ; that the 
settlement of the Mexican question in this way would neces- 
sarily lead to a peaceful settlement of our own ; that when- 
ever it should be determined that this right of local self- 
government is the principle on which all American institutions 
rest, all the States might reasonably be expected to return, of 
their own accord, to their former relations to the Union, just 
as they came together at first by their own consent, and for 
their mutual interests ; that we might become, indeed and in 
truth, an ocean-bound Federal Republic, under the operation 
of this continental regulator — the ultimate, absolute sover- 
eignty of each State. He concluded by saying that this 
Mexican question might aflford a very opportune occasion for 
reaching a proper solution of our own troubles without any 
further effusion of fraternal blood. Mr. Seward, while ad- 
mitting that the views presented by Mr. Stephens had some- 
thing specious about them in theory, argued at considerable 



[14] 

lengtli to show that practically no system of government 
founded upon them could be successfully worked, and that 
the Union could never be restored or maintained on that 
basis. He then inquired of Mr. Stephens as to the details of 
the plan he had in view for effecting the proposed purpose. 
Mr. Stephens replied that he had no fixed plan, but there were 
several which might be suggested. The whole matter might 
be easily arranged by a military convention, known only to 
the authorities at Washington and Richmond. This conven- 
tion could be made to embrace not only a suspension of actual 
hostilities on all the frontier lines, but also other matters in- 
volving the execution of the laws in States having two sets 
of authorities, one recognized by the Confederate States and 
the other adhering to the National Government. All these 
matters of detail might be easily adjusted if they should first 
determine upon an armistice for that purpose. Mr. Hunter 
said that there was not unanimity in the South upon the 
subject of undertaking the maintenance of the Monroe Doc- 
trine, and it was not probable that any arrangement could be 
made by which the Confederates would agree to join in send- 
ing any portion of their army into Mexico. In that view his 
colleagues on the Commission fully concurred. Mr. Lincoln, 
while admitting that as President, he might properly enter 
into a military convention for some of the purposes proposed, 
repeated his determination to do nothing which would suspend 
military operations, unless it was first agreed that the national 
authority was to be restored throughout the country. That 
was the first question to be settled. He could enter into no 
treaty, convention or stipulation with the Confederate States, 
jointly or separately, upon that or any other subject but upon 
the basis first settled, that the Union was to be restored. 
Any such agreement or stipulation would be a quasi recog- 
nition of the States then in array against the National Gov- 
ernment as a separate power. That he never could do. 
Judge Campbell then renewed his inquiry as to how restora- 
tion was to take place, supposing that the Confederate States 
were consenting to it. Mr. Lincoln replied: By disbanding 
their armies and permitting the national authorities to resume 



[15] 

their functions. Mr. Seward then said that Mr. Lincoln could 
not express himself more clearly or forcibly in reference to 
that question than he had done in his message to Congress in 
December, 1864, and proceeded to state its substance from 
memory. Judge Campbell said that the war had necessarily 
given rise to questions which ought to be adjusted before a 
harmonious restoration of former relations could properly be 
made. He referred to the disbandnient of the army, which 
would require time, and to the Confiscation Acts on both 
sides, under which property had been sold, the title to which 
would be affected by the facts existing when the war ended, 
unless provided for by stipulations. Mr. Seward replied that 
as to all questions involving rights of property, the courts 
would determine, and that Congress would no doubt be liberal 
in making restitution of confiscated 'property or providing 
indemnity. Mr. Stephens inquired what would be the status 
of that portion of the slave population in the Confederate 
States which had not then become free under the Emancipa- 
tion Proclamation, or in other words, what effect that Proc- 
lamation would have upon the entire black population. Mr. 
Lincoln said that was a judicial question, and he did not 
know how the courts would decide it. His own opinion was 
that as the Proclamation was a vmr measure, and would have 
effect only from its being an exercise of the war power, as 
soon as the war ended it would be inoperative for the future. 
It would be held to apply only to such slaves as had come 
under its operation while it was in active exercise. That was 
his individual opinion, but the courts might decide diff'erently. 
Mr. Seward said there were only about two hundred thousand 
slaves who up to that time had come under the actual opera- 
tion of the Proclamation, and who were then in the enjoy- 
ment of their freedom under it, so if the war should then 
cease, the status of much the larger portion of the slaves 
would be subject to judicial construction. He also called at- 
tention to the proposed constitutional amendment, providing 
for the immediate abolition of slavery throughout the United 
States. He said that was done as a war measure, and if the 
war were then to cease it would probably not be adopted by 



[16] 

a sufficient number of States to make it a part of the Consti- 
tution. In answer to an inquiry by Mr. Stephens whether 
the Confederate States would be admitted to representation 
in Congress if they should abandon the war, Mr. Lincoln said 
his own individual opinion was that they ought to be, and he 
thought they would be, but that he could not enter into any 
stipulation on that subject. Mr. Stephens having urged the 
importance of coming to some understanding as to the method 
of procedure in case the Confederate States should entertain 
the proposition of a return to the Union, Mr. Lincoln repeated 
that he could not enter into any agreement on that subject 
with parties in array against the Government. 

Mr. Hunter, in illustrating the propriety of the Executive 
entering into agreements with persons in arms against the 
rightful public authority, referred to instances of that char- 
acter between Charles First of England and the people in 
arms against him. Mr. Lincoln said he did not profess to be 
posted in history, and would turn Mr. Hunter over to Mr. 
Seward on all such matters. "All I distinctly recollect," said 
he, "about the case of Charles First is, that he lost his head 
in the end." 

Mr. Lincoln subsequently discussed fully his Emancipation 
Proclamation. He said it was not his intention in the besrin- 
ning to interfere with slavery in the States; that he never 
would have done it if he had not been compelled by necessity 
to do it to maintain the Union ; that the subject presented 
many difficult and perplexing questions; that he had hesi- 
tated for some time, and had resorted to that measure only 
when driven to it by public necessity ; that he had been in 
favor of the prohibition by the General Government of the 
extension of slavery into the Territories, but did not think 
the Government possessed power over the subject in the 
States, except as a war measure, and that he had always been 
in favor of gradual emancipation. 

Mr. Seward also spoke at length upon the progress of the 
anti-slavery sentiment of the country, and said that what he 
had thought would require forty or fifty years of agitation to 
accomplish would certainly be attained in a mucli shorter 
time. 



[17] 

Other matters relating to the evils of immediate emancipa- 
tion, especially the sufferings which would necessarily attend 
the old and infirm, as well as the women and children, were 
then referred to. These were fully admitted by Mr. Lincoln, 
but as to them he illustrated his position with an anecdote 
about the Illinois farmer and his hogs. "An Illinois farmer 
was congratulating himself with a neighbor upon a great 
discovery he had made, by which he would economize much 
time and labor in gathering and taking care of the food crop 
for his hogs, as well as trouble in looking after and feeding 
them during the winter." 

" What is it ? " said the neighbor. 

" Why it is," said the farmer, " to plant plenty of potatoes, 
and when they are mature, without either digging or housing 
them, turn the hogs in the field and let them get their own 
food as they want it." 

"But," said the neighbor, "how will they do when the 
winter comes and the ground is hard frozen ?" 

" Well," said the farmer, " let 'em root." 

Mr. Hunter inquired of Mr. Lincoln what, according to 
his idea, would be the result of the restoration of the Union 
as to West Virginia. Mr. Lincoln said he could only give 
his individual opinion, which was that West Virginia would 
continue to be recognized as a separate State in the Union. 
Mr. Hunter then very forcibly summed up the conclusions 
which seemed to him to be logically deducible from the con- 
ference. In his judgment, they amounted to nothing as a 
basis of peace but an unconditional surrender on the part of 
.the Confederate States and their people. 

Mr. Seward insisted that no words like unconditional sur- 
render had been used, or any importing or justly implying 
degradation or humiliation to the people of the Confederate 
States. He did not think that yielding to the execution of 
the laws under the Constitution of the United States, with 
all its guarantees and securities for personal and political 
rights as they might be declared by the courts, could be prop- 
erly considered as unconditional submission to conquerors, or 
as having anything humiliating in it. 



[18] 

After considerable discussion on that point between Mr. 
Hunter and Mr. Seward, Mr. Lincoln said that, so far as the 
confiscation acts and other penal acts were concerned, their 
enforcement would be left entirely to him, and he should 
exercise the power of the Executive with the utmost liberality. 
He said he would be willing to be taxed to remunerate the 
Southern people for their sl.a/es; that he believed the people 
of the North were as responsible for slavery as the people of 
the South; that if the war should then cease with the volun- 
tary abolition of slavery by the States, he should be in favor 
individually of the payment by the Government of a fair 
indemnity for the loss to the owners; that he believed this 
feeling was very extensive at the North, but on this subject 
he said he could give no assurance and entei' into no stipula- 
tion. 

The conference, after a session of about four hours, then 
terminated, and the parties took formal and friendly leave of 
each other. Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward returned to Wash- 
ington and Messrs. Stephens, Hunter and Campbell went 
back to City Point under the escort of Colonel Babcock. 
They there again met General Grant, and he was evidently 
disappointed that nothing had been accomplished in the efibrt 
to bring about a suspension of hostilities. 

It is proper to say that the facts herein stated have been 
gathered from the report of the Commissioners, bearing date 
February 5, 1865, from the message of Mr. Davis to the 
Confederate Senate and House of Representatives, communi- 
cated on February 6, 1865, from the message of Mr. Lincoln 
to the United States House of Representatives, sent in answer 
to a resolution soon after his return from Fortress Monroe, 
from conversations held with two of the Commissioners, and 
from the narrative of Mr. Stephens published soon after the 
termination of the war. The failure of the conference was 
a great disappointment, not only to the authorities at Rich- 
mond, but to the people generally. Mr. Davis in his message 
to the Confederate Senate and House of Representatives, 
transmitting the report of the Commissioners, accepted the 
action of President Lincoln and Secretary Seward as showing 



[19 ] 

that they refused to enter into negotiations with the Confed- 
erate States or any of them separately, or to give to our peo- 
ple any other terms or guarantees than those which the 
conqueror may grant, or to permit us to have peace on any 
other basis than our unconditional submission to their rule 
coupled with the acceptance of their recent legislation on 
the subject of the ralations between the white and black pop- 
ulations of each State. 

In a public address delivered before a large audience at the 
African Church in Richmond soon after the return of the 
Commissioners, he aroused the people to the highest pitch of 
^enthusiasm and incited them to renewed determination to 
continue the struggle, and stake all upon the issue. His 
speech was characterized by the boldest and most defiant tone, 
and was delivered in his loftiest and most captivating style. 
As a specimen of real oratory, it has never been surpassed 
not even by the fiery eloquence of Rienzi, when he stirred the 
hearts of the Romans to their inmost depths, or by the burn- 
ing words of Demosthenes, when he moved the Athenians to 
cry out against Philip. There were other speakers on the 
occasion referred to, and among them were Gustavus A. 
Henry, the " Eagle Orator " of Tennessee, then a member of 
the Senate, and the silver-tongued Judah P. Banjamin, of 
Louisiana, then Secretary of State. The circumstances under 
w-hich the meeting was held and the fervid eloquence of the 
speakers made a profound impression, and those present with 
one heart and one voice resolved that there was no alternative 
left but to fight on to the bitter end. The end came within 
two months, when General Lee and the remnant of his 
gallant army, having fought to the point of complete exhaus- 
tion, furled their banners and laid down their arms at 
Appomattox. 




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